Communication Law Synthesis

My experience studying the ins and outs of communication law in the United States has been a rollercoaster to say the least. I remember walking into class the very first night and being asked whether or not I would protect or restrict speech that dealt with animal cruelty, obscenity, threats and even child pornography. Being asked my personal opinion on the first night was nerve racking and definitely caught me off-guard. However, through the course of this quarter, I have really enjoyed the confusing and sometimes frustrating process of developing my own theory of free speech. Coming into this class, I had never contemplated the complexity of free speech policy. By exploring the various categories of free speech and understanding where they fall on the spectrum of acceptable and unacceptable expression, I have come to understand when and why I would ever limit the freedom of expression.

The handful of philosophers that maneuver the topic of free speech are very helpful in establishing my own guiding principles. In the beginning of the quarter, I fell in love with John Stuart Mill’s famous quote: “If mankind minus one were of one opinion, then mankind is no more justified in silencing the one than the one - if he had the power - would be justified in silencing mankind"(On Liberty). Mill’s notion of the marketplace of ideas is very important in understanding the importance of social stability in accordance with the individual role in society. However, the prime focus of Mill’s theory is to promote the discovery of truth and to benefit society as a whole. The realm of individual fulfillment is not really discussed by Mill, which I think points to a weakness is his theory. On the other hand, C. Edwin Baker does touch on the importance of individual fulfillment and the importance of self-determination. Edwin Baker bases his theory in two key values: Self-fulfillment and participation in change. This is a very libertarian theory, which I think does a great job of supplementing Mill’s theory. I think that individuals should be allowed to fulfill their expressive needs and desires as long as they do not come in the form of violence, coercive activity or the violation of rights of others. I like Baker’s philosophy because it does not entirely negate the social value of expression, but it also holds individual fulfillment as priority in free speech protection.

Throughout the quarter, as I analyzed specific cases dealing with the categories of protected and unprotected speech, I found myself fairly consistent. For the most part, I found myself relying on the precedent set by Brandenburg v Ohio, also known as incitement. I believe that speech should only be restricted if it incites imminent and immediate harm to someone (human or animal). One of the first cases I applied this to was the issue of incitement to genocide in the case of the Rwandan Genocide. I found Hassan Ngeze, the founder, publisher and editor of Kangura, not guilty. Even though his speech was clearly offensive and had a tendency to cause harm, it cannot be proven that he directly incited violence in the Rwandan Genocide. I stand behind this decision because although I do not agree with his choice to express himself in the manner he chose, I do not feel the government or anyone else has the right to impose restrictions on his individual liberty to express himself without causing direct harm to others. Like Baker, I would argue for the importance of self-determination and the freedom of the individual to make their own decision about how to express themselves. We can hope that people communicate in a socially responsible manner, but it is not the government’s responsibility to force them to behave responsibly if violence is not being incited.

In dealing with the issue of obscenity, I was also compelled to extend the utmost protection to obscene or sexual speech. Sexual expression is a fundamental aspect of the human experience and there should not be a universal definition of what it should look like or how it should be expressed. In the Supreme Court, the burden of proof is traditionally placed on the government or the plaintiff. In other words, the defendant is not required to prove the worth of their own speech. However, in the case of obscenity it is reversed; the burden of proof is on the creator of the speech. This is something I find quite unnecessary. I believe that the burden of proof should always be on the government or plaintiff, not the speaker. As long as harm is not incited, the defendant should not have to prove the worth of their sexual expression. The subjective nature of this category of speech, as well as others, does not provide a firm basis for restricting its creation and distribution. Along with obscenity law, I also find the SLAPS clause as outlined in Miller v California to be very frustrating. I don’t think that artistic value can be judged in a courtroom. Again, the subjective nature of artistic expression is too broad and I do not agree with the notion that a court can rule one piece of art worthwhile and another worthless. In the end, the only way in which I would restrict sexual expression is when it incites harm, i.e. directly causes rape or other undesired violence toward others.

The category of speech I found most troublesome is child pornography. This is the only case I have encountered thus far in which I would impose tight restrictions on speech. In reviewing cases like Sally Mann’s photography of her children and the movie Tin Drum, I find myself very bothered by the presence of such speech. In the case of Sally Mann, I wonder about her artistic process and her children’s ability to refuse to be part of her work and I also wonder how they will perceive their photos in the future. Like the harm theory outlined in New York v Ferber, were her children exploited in the making of the images and will they be shamed by their continuing presence? In the case of the movie Tin Drum, I found myself very bothered by the actual ages of the actors in the film – the 11 year-old boy engaging in sexual acts with a 24 year-old actress really pushed me over the edge. This urged me to establish an age precedent for sexual expression. I would argue that if the actual age of a child in a pornographic depiction is under 14, the image should be restricted. If the adolescent is 14 or older, it should be protected. This precedent, I believe would allow for the protection of the current phenomenon of “sexting,” a trend in which adolescents have been exploring their own sexuality by snapping sexual pictures of themselves and sending them to friends. Because 14 is the age at which young people begin exploring their sexual identities, I do not believe such acts should be criminalized. The notion that kids are being registered as sex offenders for exchanging pornographic pictures with their friends seems like nonsense to me.

I can honestly say that this has been one of the most interesting and engaging courses of my undergraduate career. Not only have I learned about the vast theories of free speech, but I have learned to evaluate Supreme Court decisions based on my learning and own personal beliefs, which has guided me to establish my own free speech theory. The freedom of expression, I believe, is as fundamental as religious freedom. Like the freedom to declare and practice our own faith, our ability to express ourselves is a fundamental human right that promotes both the marketplace of ideas theory outlined by John Stuart Mill and the individual liberty theory of speech established by Edwin Baker. Except in the case of child pornography, I am willing to give speech ultimate protection under the precedent set in Brandenburg v Ohio. I believe that everyone should be free to express themselves in the means most appropriate to their own lives and to employ their own self-determination to make decisions dealing with speech.

Overturning USA v Stevens and 18 U.S.C. § 48

In reviewing the ruling in United States of America v. Robert J. Stevens, I have decided to overturn the law passed by Congress. The statute in question, 18 U.S.C. § 48 states: (a) Whoever knowingly creates, sells, or possesses a depiction of animal cruelty with the intention of placing that depiction in interstate or foreign commerce for commercial gain, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both; and (b) This restriction does not apply to any depiction that has serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value. The case of USA v Stevens deals with the issue of the production and sale of dog-fighting videos. Stevens himself did not participate in the facilitation of the dog fights in his videos, but simply compiled footage of historical dogfights that took place both in the United States, where dogfighting is illegal and in Japan, where it is not.

Originally, 18 U.S.C. § 48 was established to halt the phenomena known as crush videos. Crush videos became more prevalent with the growth of the internet and congress wanted to criminalize the sale and possession of such videos in hopes of eradicating the market. However, in formulating the statute targeting crush videos, Congress created a law that is overly broad and has created an entirely new category of unprotected speech. More than two decades after the last category of unprotected speech was declared, Congress has established a new one. This new category joins the likes of fighting words (Chaplinsky v New Hampshire), speech that imminently incites illegal activity (Brandenburg v Ohio) and child pornography restrictions (NY v Ferber). In upholding this new category of unprotected speech, the government claims that they are directly impeding the actual act of animal cruelty by criminalizing its depiction. In seeking to refute their claim that the law upheld in USA v Stevens is constitutional, we will look at philosophical and doctrinal issues at hand when banning depictions of animal cruelty, as well as the level of harm that should be applied and the level of scrutiny required to be met by the government.

In defense of 18 U.S.C. § 48, the court employs the help of the landmark case, Chaplinsky v New Hampshire in which two categories of speech were established: “ (1) That which has social value as a step to truth; and (2) That which has no social value as a step to truth.” (p 170, Freedom of Speech in the Unites States). This ruling is directly taken from the philosophy of Zechariah Chafee and is later described as the two-level system of free speech that distinguishes between worthwhile and worthless expression. Unlike Congress in this case, I would not employ the help of Chafee. Rather, I would turn to Edwin Baker and his “Liberty Theory.” The Liberty theory of the freedom of expression as described by Baker argues for the importance of self-realization and self-determination (p441). This notion of self-determination I think is very important in the case of animal cruelty. In applying Baker’s theory I do not attempt to defend the activity of being cruel to animals, and neither would Baker (he does not condone violent expression) but the freedom to trade and possess depictions of it is not, in my mind, directly perpetuating the act nor should it be subject to government restriction. It should not be left up to the government to define worthwhile and worthless speech, but it should be at the liberty of each individual to decide that for him or herself insomuch as it does not incite harm to others.

In defense of their ruling in the case of depictions of animal cruelty, Congress grounds their claims in New York v Ferber, the case ruling which made it illegal to create, sell and possess child pornography. In analyzing the connections between animal cruelty and child pornography, it is clear that the ruling in Ferber do not hold relevance in this new statute. The first argument is that like the issue of child pornography, the prevention of animal cruelty is a compelling government interest and therefore would survive strict scrutiny. However, as argued by the dissenters in USA v Stevens, “Preventing cruelty to animals, although an exceedingly worthy goal, simply does not implicate interests of the same magnitude as protecting children from physical and psychological harm.” There have already been laws enacted in all 50 states that target animal cruelty and it is not clear that criminalizing depictions of animal cruelty would eradicate the actual crime in the same way that Ferber prevents the exploitation and harm done to children from child pornography.

Secondly, although it is clear that animals should be treated kindly, it is extremely unlikely that they suffer continuously from having the disputed images floating around. Children, on the other hand can and do suffer continuously from depictions of child pornography.

Thirdly, there is no evidence supporting the argument that criminalizing the depiction of animal cruelty will decrease “production” and ultimately halt the occurrence of cruelty to animals. Many people who commit such crimes do not do so to make money by selling depictions of their actions. Cruelty to animals is something that will continue regardless and depictions of such activity is more commonly repulsive to its viewers than a motive for future infringements of the law. In other words, I don’t think the simple viewing of animal cruelty does harm, it is the action itself, which is already illegal.

Finally, the exceptions clause is extremely contradictory to the law itself. If the purpose of criminalizing depictions of animal cruelty is truly seeking to stop the actual action of animal cruelty, then why is it okay to depict this cruelty in some cases? Ferber does not include a SLAPS clause, so if these two cases are so similar, then why should the restrictions on animal cruelty include one? This inclusion of a SLAPS clause is similar to the precedent established in Miller v California and has nothing to do with Ferber, which Congress claims as the basis of this new category of unprotected speech.

A side-note I would like Congress to consider is the relation between animal cruelty and violence on television. One of the arguments given by the court is that depictions of animal cruelty inspire others to act in the same way and that violence to animals ignites the tendency to commit violent crimes against humans. However, if that is the case, why would it be any more acceptable to depict violence among humans on television – wouldn’t that inspire illegal violent activity in the same way?

In seeking to restrict speech pertaining to animal cruelty, I believe the government should have to meet strict scrutiny. Because I do not believe the government has an actual compelling interest in restricting the depiction of animal cruelty, I do not think they will meet this burden of proof. Their interest is not compelling because in restricting this kind of speech, I do not believe acts of animal cruelty will shrink in number.

In the end, I would overturn 18 U.S.C. § 48 on the terms that it does not concern a compelling government interest in the same way that issues of child pornography do. Also, if we look at the defense arguments, we see that the law itself is overly broad in that it could criminalize the depiction of things like pictures taken while hunting animals. The law is not refined in its original efforts to solely dry up the market for crush videos. If the government wanted to stop these specific videos, why not specifically say so? Instead, they have created an entirely new, overbroad category of unprotected speech that threatens the liberty of individuals who have committed no crime themselves, while doing nothing to prevent the actual illegal act of animal cruelty. In altering this statute, I would employ the harm theory of incitement made precedent in Brandenburg v Ohio. Only if the speech in question imminently and immediately causes harm to individuals (humans or animals) should it be restricted by the government.

Jesus Castillo jr. v Texas

The 2000 case of Jesus Castillo is the topic of this analysis. The case of Jesus A. Castillo, jr. v Texas arose when Castillo, owner of the store Keith’s Comics, was convicted for misdemeanor for selling sexually explicit comic books. After receiving a complaint from a citizen, an undercover detective from the Dallas Police Department entered the “adult only” section to seek out proof that the complaint of sexually explicit content was warranted. Low and behold, he found a comic book titled “Demon Beast Invasion, The Fallen,” which depicted a nude female on the cover, along with a warning that it was not for people under the age of 18. Even though the explicit material was confined to an “adult only” section of the store where children were not permitted, the court deemed it important to consider the fact that the store was located in “a neighborhood of residences, businesses, and an elementary school.” (see case report by clicking on previous hyperlink). In the final ruling of the case, Castillo was convicted. According to the article “Arts and first amendment” by James McWilliams, “Castillo was sentenced to 180 days in jail, a year of probation and a $4,000 fine, after the prosecutor in the case told the jury, "I don't care what type of evidence or what type of testimony is out there, use your rationality, use your common sense. Comic books … are for kids." Under the assumed standard that comic books are a medium strictly for children, they should be spared sexually-explicit content. This assumption by the court especially bothers me. Is it right for someone to determine what mediums can or cannot be used by certain groups of people?

In reviewing this case, I would completely disagree with the decision issued by the court. I would not have convicted nor proposed future restrictions on Castillo’s speech. At one instance in the ruling rationale, it seems as though the court is relying on the distant standard set in Roth v US. In this 1957 case, the notion of local standards is enacted. The court argues that speech should be considered obscene if the average person finds it appeals to prurient interests and has no social value. In the case of Castillo, it is determined that these comic books are “patently offensive to the average Texan's community standards.” This whole notion of community standards is conflicting for me. How can one person or even one group of people determine the values for an entire community? This, to me violates the United States’ standard of freedom of expression. By establishing a ruling majority value as precedent, all individuals who do not fall within that boundary are silenced.

When looking at the ruling of this case in connection to the more recent precedent set in Miller v California, we realize that something has been left out. In the case of Miller v California, Justice Brennan determined that all sexual speech should be protected, as long as it does not involve a captive audience or children. In the case of Castillo, he had established a clear distinction between the “adult only” section and the rest of his store. In order to find the sexually explicit comic books in the first place, one must be a consenting adult. The undercover detective was not forced to locate, look at or purchase the comic book, but voluntarily did so. I believe that Castillo did all that was required of him to prevent the sexually explicit material from landing in the hands of a child or even of adults who did not wish to be exposed to it.

Another argument proposed in the case is that the comic book in question lacked “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” The notion of judging a work based on artistic value really bothers me. Who’s right is it to judge another’s artistic expression? Generally speaking, there is an audience for every kind of expression imaginable. I strongly disagree with the belief that artistic expression that does not fall within the boundaries of accepted interest should be suppressed. I think that in these kind of cases, this notion of artistic value should be thrown out entirely because it is no one’s right to judge another’s expression for validity.

In reviewing this case and others that deal with issues of obscene speech, I find myself leading towards a harm principle. Although large portions of society may not agree with nor want to expose themselves to obscene material, I do not think that it should be restricted on the basis of communal standards or artistic value. The truth is that sexuality is a huge part of human identity whether we want to acknowledge that fact or not. When we look to our historical roots in Greek and Roman society, we see that sexuality was often celebrated in a more straightforward manner than it is today. Currently, I think the American perspective on sexuality is oppressive to the natural human desire and need to express ourselves. In looking to historical perspectives and even in comparing the societal standards on sex in the United States to other cultures around the world, sex is seen as something shameful and something to keep hidden. This perspective isn’t necessarily wrong, but I think we need to understand that it is not absolute. The state of restrictions on obscenity in the United States at this moment bothers me because it entirely contradicts our advancements in the area of free speech which we hold so highly. Perhaps a harm principle would be more liberating and just. As I learned in our last class, harm has never been proven in a case of obscene speech. This is a standard I would like to investigate further because I think it would be the most just form of restricting obscene speech. If the speech in question is not directly causing harm to someone, then I don’t think it should be restricted. As of right now, the United States restriction of obscene speech stands out like a sore thumb in comparison to its views on freedom of expression and I think it needs to be reviewed and improved to reach those high standards of individual liberty of expression.

Ngeze's Kangura - incitement or free speech?

In 1991 the Rwandan, Hutu-owned tabloid Kangura published an image on their front page of a machete accompanied by the question “What weapons shall we use to conquer the inyenzi once and for all?” The term inyenzi, literally meaning “cockroach” had come to be a discriminatory label placed on all Tutsis.  Many anti-Tutsi articles, including “the 10 Hutu Commandments,” were thereafter published by Kangura.  More than 2 years after this first printing, in April 1994, the Rwandan Genocide began in which hundreds of thousands of Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed.  Estimates of the death toll during this intense period of unrest have ranged from 500,000-1,000,000. 

            The question surrounding this issue is whether or not Hassan Ngeze, the founder, publisher and editor of Kangura can be found guilty of inciting genocide based on the anti-Tutsi propaganda he published.  The difficult part about this case is that he never published direct orders for the mass killings of the Tutsi, and he halted the hate articles before the killings actually began in 1994.  Many would argue without hesitation that Ngeze should be found guilty, but did he incite genocide, or was he merely exercising his right to free speech?

            In 1997, Ngeze was indicted for incitement to genocide by the International Crime Tribunal for Rwanda and was, after a trial lasting three years, convicted.  The ruling was defended by this explanation: “Without a firearm, machete or any physical weapon, you caused the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians.” Furthermore, they said it was clear that Ngeze’s goal was to “spread petrol throughout the country little by little, so that one day [they] would be able to set fire to the whole country” (see article: "Inciting Genocide, Pleading Free Speech").

            In looking to solve this case on my own, I will employ the help of philosopher Thomas I. Emerson and his work “The System of Freedom of Expression.” According to Emerson, there should be a clear distinction between expression and action.  Expression, he argues is completely protected by the US Constitution, but action is more likely to face restrictions.  Emerson argues that “expression that is intentionally insulting or otherwise provocative is a form of speech protected by the constitution – the audience, although angered, has a duty to restrain itself.”(See Freedom of Speech in the United States, 5th Ed., p 439)  He then explains his opinion of the “fighting words” doctrine by stating that they shall only be restricted when used face-to-face as “ ‘verbal acts’ composing an assault upon the individual toward whom they are directed.” (Freedom of Speech in the United States, p 439). In the case of Kangura, the messages were all nonverbal, and not issued in face-to-face, and according to Emerson’s expression-action theory would be categorized as expression and therefore entirely protected. 

            To go along with Emerson’s theory of free speech, I will also apply the incitement to harm theory.  Did Kangura’s messages cause immediate and imminent harm?  I would argue that the messages published by Kangura definitely had a tendency to cause harm, but because the harm was not an immediate result of these publications, that they cannot be charged with incitement to genocide.  This precedent was set in the landmark case Brandenburg v. Ohio in 1969 when Ku Klux Klan leader Clarence Brandenburg was being tried for a speech he gave at a rally where he threatened “revengeance against the president, the Congress and the Supreme Court…” (Freedom of Speech in the United States, 66) The Supreme Court unanimously reversed his conviction, setting the new standard of incitement, in which even threatening words are protected as long as they don’t pose immediate and imminent danger.  The findings in this case should definitely be applied the judgment of the Kangura case.  Under such standards, Ngeze would not be convicted because of the unspecific nature of his messages and because they did not lead to immediate harm. 

            One of the most important facts to remember in this case is that Ngeze did not publish any specific instructions on how to carry out genocide, nor did he publish any orders whatsoever directly calling for the mass murder of Tutsis.  In this same case, Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, founders of a radio station, Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) were also tried under incitement to genocide.  Nahimana and Barayagwiza had created more explicit messages than did Ngeze.  In some cases, names of specific Tutsi citizens and specific details of how to find them were announced over radio so that they could be found and killed. Because of the more specific nature of those messages, they should be convicted of incitement because the harm was imminent and immediate.

            Finally, I will apply strict scrutiny in the ruling of this case.  The court would have establish a very compelling reason for restructing Ngeze’s speech and would have to do so in the least restrcitve means possible.  Because of the slightly ambiguous content of Ngeze’s messages, I do not think they could be struck down with compelling reasons by the court. 

            In ruling this case, I would acquit Ngeze of incitement to genocide for the reasons outlined above.  Although I personally do not agree with his messages, I do not feel they should be punished by law.  Ngeze, unlike many others in the onset of the Rwandan Genocide, did not provide explicit details on how to carry out the mass murders nor did he specifically order for mass killings of the Tutsis.  Yes, it is likely that his messages did contribute to fueling the Rwandan Genocide, but alone, his messages were not capable of carrying out such a strategic, planned attack like the one that unfolded years later. 

 

 

"Ecce Homo" and Jyllands-Posten Muhammad Controversies

Laws governing communication should primarily protect an individual universal civil liberty even if asserted against the group. To support this statement, I will employ three specific examples: Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideology of English philosopher and economist John Stuart Mill and the ruling of Burstyn v. Wilson.

Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts that “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression.” Nowhere in this article does it claim a government’s responsibility to suppress blasphemous speech. No matter the nature of an individual’s opinion, they have the right to express it.

English philosopher and economist John Stuart Mill argued in Chapter II of his article On Liberty that “If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.” Not only is this quotation powerful on its own, but Mill supports it with three very rational assertions. Firstly, that the unpopular opinion may indeed hold truth and the popular opinion may be false. Secondly, even truth needs to be challenged so it does not become “dead dogma”. And thirdly, there is likely at least some truth in all opinions. Mill was a passionate advocate for free speech and believed that conflict surrounding it was an important contributor to the development of humankind. By suppressing individual expression of opinion, governments would thus hinder intellectual and social progress.

Finally, the case of Burstyn v. Wilson is yet another demonstration of the importance of unrestricted freedom of expression. The 1952 case entailed the overturning of a New York Law allowing state censorship to prohibit the public showing of any unlicensed film or to revoke the license of one deemed “sacrilegious.” The restriction of the film The Miracle was the topic of the debate. The film, directed by Roberto Rossellini and distributed in English by Joseph Burstyn was deemed sacrilegious in New York State because of the blasphemous representation of a young peasant woman who believed she was the Virgin Mary after being impregnated by the man she deemed to be St. Joseph. Concerning this case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that states did not have the right to restrict the freedom of expression on the basis of it being sacrilegious. This case made it clear that motion picture as a medium to express opinion is protected under the first Amendment. Most importantly, the US Supreme Court asserted that blasphemy is not a warranted basis for suppressing ideas in the United States of America.

With support from the previous examples, I argue that laws governing communication should primarily protect an individual universal civil liberty even if asserted against the group. Now, I will apply this principle to the cases involving the “Ecce Homo” satirizing of Jesus and the Jyllands-Posten satirizing of Muhammad.

From 1998 to 2004, an exhibition featuring 12 different photographic depictions of biblical situations gave rise to a heated social debate. The Ecce Homo Exhibition, which made its debut in Stockholm in 1998, included pictures of Jesus surrounded by homosexuals, trans people, leather people and people with AIDS. Later, the pictures were displayed in various locations around Europe, including in the cathedral of Uppsala in Sweden. Many strong responses emerged from the exhibition, both positive and negative. Although many were offended by this form of expression, I strongly believe that this kind of speech, albeit contrary to majority opinion, should be protected by government. The case of Burstyn v. Wilson is an example from which I draw this conclusion. In this court hearing, it was determined that individual speech shall not be suppressed on the basis of blasphemy. Although some Christians found this display of artistic expression offensive, it did not cause physical harm to any audience. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also supports this form of free speech because of its claim that “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression.” Article 18 also provides a basis for protecting this kind of free speech: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” According to this article, the individual can “manifest” his beliefs. The Ecce Homo exhibition is the perfect example of an individual artist manifesting their beliefs in a setting open to the public. By disallowing this kind of free speech, a government would effectively be excluding an individual or group from participating in the religion of their choosing.

Another important situation to examine is the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy that began in 2005, when a group of editorial cartoonists were asked by the Jyllands-Posten newspaper in Denmark to submit a cartoon depicting their view of Muhammad. Twelve cartoons were printed on September 30, 2005, announced by the newspaper as an attempt to open the debate surrounding the discrimination of Islam and self-censorship in general. However, the response was not favorable as protests broke out around the world by discontented Muslims, some of which ended in violence. Some of the protests provoked police to fire on crowds, killing 100 people. Many people labeled the cartoons as blasphemous and extremely offensive to Islam. Others argued that the creation and publication of the cartoons was an exercise of free speech and not intended to discriminate against the Muslim World or to marginalize them from other religious sectors.

Although the resulting violence and deaths associated with the controversy were very disheartening, I still believe that this was a demonstration of free speech that should be protected by law. In this case, I find it very helpful to draw on the ideology of John Stuart Mill. Mill believed strongly that the suppression of free speech hindered intellectual and social progress. I agree with the Jyllands-Posten’s intention to open up a debate about current issues surrounding the world of Islam. I think that in order to foster a better understanding of marginalized groups, we must fully expose all existing bases for discrimination. Self-censorship is an escalating problem in our global society and will continue to hinder social development if it is not revealed by strong displays of free speech. That being said, I think it is also the individual’s responsibility to maintain moral standards when expressing opinions. Because of the personal and often diverse character of morality, I don’t believe it can nor should be regulated by law. Rather, moral communication is a responsibility we as members of humankind must be thoughtful of to foster a just global community. Under law, I believe that the Jyllands-Post Cartoon publications were just; but whether they could be considered moral communication, is an entirely different debate.