Ngeze's Kangura - incitement or free speech?

In 1991 the Rwandan, Hutu-owned tabloid Kangura published an image on their front page of a machete accompanied by the question “What weapons shall we use to conquer the inyenzi once and for all?” The term inyenzi, literally meaning “cockroach” had come to be a discriminatory label placed on all Tutsis.  Many anti-Tutsi articles, including “the 10 Hutu Commandments,” were thereafter published by Kangura.  More than 2 years after this first printing, in April 1994, the Rwandan Genocide began in which hundreds of thousands of Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed.  Estimates of the death toll during this intense period of unrest have ranged from 500,000-1,000,000. 

            The question surrounding this issue is whether or not Hassan Ngeze, the founder, publisher and editor of Kangura can be found guilty of inciting genocide based on the anti-Tutsi propaganda he published.  The difficult part about this case is that he never published direct orders for the mass killings of the Tutsi, and he halted the hate articles before the killings actually began in 1994.  Many would argue without hesitation that Ngeze should be found guilty, but did he incite genocide, or was he merely exercising his right to free speech?

            In 1997, Ngeze was indicted for incitement to genocide by the International Crime Tribunal for Rwanda and was, after a trial lasting three years, convicted.  The ruling was defended by this explanation: “Without a firearm, machete or any physical weapon, you caused the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians.” Furthermore, they said it was clear that Ngeze’s goal was to “spread petrol throughout the country little by little, so that one day [they] would be able to set fire to the whole country” (see article: "Inciting Genocide, Pleading Free Speech").

            In looking to solve this case on my own, I will employ the help of philosopher Thomas I. Emerson and his work “The System of Freedom of Expression.” According to Emerson, there should be a clear distinction between expression and action.  Expression, he argues is completely protected by the US Constitution, but action is more likely to face restrictions.  Emerson argues that “expression that is intentionally insulting or otherwise provocative is a form of speech protected by the constitution – the audience, although angered, has a duty to restrain itself.”(See Freedom of Speech in the United States, 5th Ed., p 439)  He then explains his opinion of the “fighting words” doctrine by stating that they shall only be restricted when used face-to-face as “ ‘verbal acts’ composing an assault upon the individual toward whom they are directed.” (Freedom of Speech in the United States, p 439). In the case of Kangura, the messages were all nonverbal, and not issued in face-to-face, and according to Emerson’s expression-action theory would be categorized as expression and therefore entirely protected. 

            To go along with Emerson’s theory of free speech, I will also apply the incitement to harm theory.  Did Kangura’s messages cause immediate and imminent harm?  I would argue that the messages published by Kangura definitely had a tendency to cause harm, but because the harm was not an immediate result of these publications, that they cannot be charged with incitement to genocide.  This precedent was set in the landmark case Brandenburg v. Ohio in 1969 when Ku Klux Klan leader Clarence Brandenburg was being tried for a speech he gave at a rally where he threatened “revengeance against the president, the Congress and the Supreme Court…” (Freedom of Speech in the United States, 66) The Supreme Court unanimously reversed his conviction, setting the new standard of incitement, in which even threatening words are protected as long as they don’t pose immediate and imminent danger.  The findings in this case should definitely be applied the judgment of the Kangura case.  Under such standards, Ngeze would not be convicted because of the unspecific nature of his messages and because they did not lead to immediate harm. 

            One of the most important facts to remember in this case is that Ngeze did not publish any specific instructions on how to carry out genocide, nor did he publish any orders whatsoever directly calling for the mass murder of Tutsis.  In this same case, Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, founders of a radio station, Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) were also tried under incitement to genocide.  Nahimana and Barayagwiza had created more explicit messages than did Ngeze.  In some cases, names of specific Tutsi citizens and specific details of how to find them were announced over radio so that they could be found and killed. Because of the more specific nature of those messages, they should be convicted of incitement because the harm was imminent and immediate.

            Finally, I will apply strict scrutiny in the ruling of this case.  The court would have establish a very compelling reason for restructing Ngeze’s speech and would have to do so in the least restrcitve means possible.  Because of the slightly ambiguous content of Ngeze’s messages, I do not think they could be struck down with compelling reasons by the court. 

            In ruling this case, I would acquit Ngeze of incitement to genocide for the reasons outlined above.  Although I personally do not agree with his messages, I do not feel they should be punished by law.  Ngeze, unlike many others in the onset of the Rwandan Genocide, did not provide explicit details on how to carry out the mass murders nor did he specifically order for mass killings of the Tutsis.  Yes, it is likely that his messages did contribute to fueling the Rwandan Genocide, but alone, his messages were not capable of carrying out such a strategic, planned attack like the one that unfolded years later. 

 

 

"Ecce Homo" and Jyllands-Posten Muhammad Controversies

Laws governing communication should primarily protect an individual universal civil liberty even if asserted against the group. To support this statement, I will employ three specific examples: Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideology of English philosopher and economist John Stuart Mill and the ruling of Burstyn v. Wilson.

Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts that “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression.” Nowhere in this article does it claim a government’s responsibility to suppress blasphemous speech. No matter the nature of an individual’s opinion, they have the right to express it.

English philosopher and economist John Stuart Mill argued in Chapter II of his article On Liberty that “If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.” Not only is this quotation powerful on its own, but Mill supports it with three very rational assertions. Firstly, that the unpopular opinion may indeed hold truth and the popular opinion may be false. Secondly, even truth needs to be challenged so it does not become “dead dogma”. And thirdly, there is likely at least some truth in all opinions. Mill was a passionate advocate for free speech and believed that conflict surrounding it was an important contributor to the development of humankind. By suppressing individual expression of opinion, governments would thus hinder intellectual and social progress.

Finally, the case of Burstyn v. Wilson is yet another demonstration of the importance of unrestricted freedom of expression. The 1952 case entailed the overturning of a New York Law allowing state censorship to prohibit the public showing of any unlicensed film or to revoke the license of one deemed “sacrilegious.” The restriction of the film The Miracle was the topic of the debate. The film, directed by Roberto Rossellini and distributed in English by Joseph Burstyn was deemed sacrilegious in New York State because of the blasphemous representation of a young peasant woman who believed she was the Virgin Mary after being impregnated by the man she deemed to be St. Joseph. Concerning this case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that states did not have the right to restrict the freedom of expression on the basis of it being sacrilegious. This case made it clear that motion picture as a medium to express opinion is protected under the first Amendment. Most importantly, the US Supreme Court asserted that blasphemy is not a warranted basis for suppressing ideas in the United States of America.

With support from the previous examples, I argue that laws governing communication should primarily protect an individual universal civil liberty even if asserted against the group. Now, I will apply this principle to the cases involving the “Ecce Homo” satirizing of Jesus and the Jyllands-Posten satirizing of Muhammad.

From 1998 to 2004, an exhibition featuring 12 different photographic depictions of biblical situations gave rise to a heated social debate. The Ecce Homo Exhibition, which made its debut in Stockholm in 1998, included pictures of Jesus surrounded by homosexuals, trans people, leather people and people with AIDS. Later, the pictures were displayed in various locations around Europe, including in the cathedral of Uppsala in Sweden. Many strong responses emerged from the exhibition, both positive and negative. Although many were offended by this form of expression, I strongly believe that this kind of speech, albeit contrary to majority opinion, should be protected by government. The case of Burstyn v. Wilson is an example from which I draw this conclusion. In this court hearing, it was determined that individual speech shall not be suppressed on the basis of blasphemy. Although some Christians found this display of artistic expression offensive, it did not cause physical harm to any audience. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also supports this form of free speech because of its claim that “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression.” Article 18 also provides a basis for protecting this kind of free speech: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” According to this article, the individual can “manifest” his beliefs. The Ecce Homo exhibition is the perfect example of an individual artist manifesting their beliefs in a setting open to the public. By disallowing this kind of free speech, a government would effectively be excluding an individual or group from participating in the religion of their choosing.

Another important situation to examine is the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy that began in 2005, when a group of editorial cartoonists were asked by the Jyllands-Posten newspaper in Denmark to submit a cartoon depicting their view of Muhammad. Twelve cartoons were printed on September 30, 2005, announced by the newspaper as an attempt to open the debate surrounding the discrimination of Islam and self-censorship in general. However, the response was not favorable as protests broke out around the world by discontented Muslims, some of which ended in violence. Some of the protests provoked police to fire on crowds, killing 100 people. Many people labeled the cartoons as blasphemous and extremely offensive to Islam. Others argued that the creation and publication of the cartoons was an exercise of free speech and not intended to discriminate against the Muslim World or to marginalize them from other religious sectors.

Although the resulting violence and deaths associated with the controversy were very disheartening, I still believe that this was a demonstration of free speech that should be protected by law. In this case, I find it very helpful to draw on the ideology of John Stuart Mill. Mill believed strongly that the suppression of free speech hindered intellectual and social progress. I agree with the Jyllands-Posten’s intention to open up a debate about current issues surrounding the world of Islam. I think that in order to foster a better understanding of marginalized groups, we must fully expose all existing bases for discrimination. Self-censorship is an escalating problem in our global society and will continue to hinder social development if it is not revealed by strong displays of free speech. That being said, I think it is also the individual’s responsibility to maintain moral standards when expressing opinions. Because of the personal and often diverse character of morality, I don’t believe it can nor should be regulated by law. Rather, moral communication is a responsibility we as members of humankind must be thoughtful of to foster a just global community. Under law, I believe that the Jyllands-Post Cartoon publications were just; but whether they could be considered moral communication, is an entirely different debate.